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. 
. 
. 
. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was initially charged with Second Degree 
Murder, in violation of § 76-5-203, Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
as amended. Subsequently, an amended information was filed 
charging appellant with Manslaughter by having recklessly 
caused the death of another in violation of § 76-5-205, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On March 5, 1980, counsel for the State was granted 
his motion to file an amended information charging appellant 
with the crime of manslaughter in violation of § 76-5-205, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended. On the same day 
before the Honorable David Sam, in the Fourth Judicial District 
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Court, in and for Duchesne County, State of Utah, appellant 
pled guilty to the charge of manslaughter. On April 11, 1980, 
appellant was sentenced by Judge Sam to the Utah State Prison 
for a period of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years as provided by§ 76-3-203(2), Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
as amended. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of Judge Sam's denial 
of appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, rejection 
of appellant's claimed due process violation, and affirmation 
of the sentence imposed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 4, 1979 appellant brought his infant 
daughter, Camie Lee Hanson, to the Duchesne County Hospital 
in Roosevelt, Utah for the treatment of multiple injuries. 
Shortly after arriving at the hospital the infant died. On 
September 5, 1979 appellant was charged with the crime of 
Murder in the Second Degree in violation of § 76-5-203 Utah 
Code Annotated (1953), as amended. 
On November 13, 1979, the date set for arraignment 
in District Court, appellant was in the psychiatric unit of 
St. Mark's Hospital for treatment. Pursuant to a request by 
defense counsel, Judge Sam, ordered the arraignment continued 
to December 10, 1979 (R. 20). 
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Prior to the December 10, 1979 arraignment, 
appellant filed notice of his intent to rely on the defense 
of insanity pursuant to§ 77-24-17, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), as amended (R. 21). At the arraignment, appellant 
entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of 
insanity. At that time the Court ordered appellant to be 
examined by two psychiatrists who were to determine appellant's 
sanity at the time of the offense. Jury trial was set for 
February 7, 1980 by Judge Sam (R. 22), but was subsequently 
rescheduled for March 5, 1980 (R. 25). 
During the period prior to the March 5, 1980 trial 
date, the State and the defense entered into plea negotiations, 
the result being the filing of an amended information on 
March 5, 1980 charging appellant with manslaughter in violation 
of § 76-5-205, Utah Cod~ Annotated (R. 26). To the amended 
information appellant entered a plea of guilty. Counsel for 
the State indicated to the court that it would be in the 
best interest of appellant that he not be incarcerated but 
that he continue with treatment (R. 27). The court advised 
appellant of his rights regarding the entry of a guilty plea, 
and informed appellant that the court would not be bound by 
any recommendations (R. 27). Lastly the court determined 
that appellant made such plea voluntarily and with full 
knowledge of his rights. The court referred the matter to 
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Adult Probation and Parole for a pre-sentence investigation 
and report, and continued the case until April 11, 1980 for 
sentencing (R. 27). 
On April 11, 1980, following a meeting in chambers 
with the trial judge and prior to sentencing, appellant moved 
for a continuance of one week to allow time to file against 
Judge Sam continuing in the case (R. 131). This motion was 
denied. Appellant further moved to withdraw his guilty plea 
which was also denied (R. 132). Finding no legal reason 
why judgment should not be pronounced, the trial court 
sentenced defendant to the Utah State Prison for a period of 
not less than one year nor more than fifteen years (R. 28, 133). 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO PERMIT 
APPELLANT TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF 
GUILTY. 
Appellant has correctly stated the law that under 
the terms of§ 77-24~3 Utah Code Annotated (1953), as -amended, 
and according to the great weight of authority, a motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty is addressed to the sound discretion 
of the trial court, and that a criminal defendant may not 
withdraw a guilty plea as a matter of right. State v. Plum, 
14 Utah 2d 124, 378 P.2d 671 (1963); State v. Harris, 585 P 2d 
450 (Utah 1978). Appellant is contending, however, that the 
trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow him to 
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withdraw his guilty plea. As relief, appellant asks this 
Court to allow the withdrawal of his guilty plea, and to 
remand the case for trial. Respondent respectfully submits 
that the trial court's refusal to allow appellant to withdraw 
his plea of guilty was within the discretion granted that 
court by law. Respondent therefore asks this Court to affirm 
the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea and to affirm the sentence imposed. 
Appellant was originally charged with Second Degree 
Murder under § 76-5-203 Utah Code Annotated (1953), as 
amended. On the day scheduled for trial on the murder charge, 
the State moved to amend the information and to charge appellant 
with manslaughter. Since appellant had no objection, the court 
granted the motion and appellant pled guilty. 
Before accepting appellant's guilty plea to the 
charge of manslaughter, the trial court explained to appellant 
his rights regarding entry of a guilty plea. The trial court 
also advised appellant that it was not bound by recommendations 
of the doctors, County Attorney or the Adult Probation and 
Parole Department (R. 27). The trial court found appellant's 
guilty plea to be free and voluntary made with full knowledge 
of his rights and the possible consequences (R. 27). 
This questioning by the court meets the requirements 
of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709 
-5-
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(1969) that a guilty plea be knowingly and intelligently 
given, and Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294, 452 P.2d 
323 (1969), that a plea be made voluntarily, without undue 
influence or coercion. Respondent submits that the trial 
court fulfilled its duty under the law in determining 
that appellant's plea was voluntarily given. Under the 
rationale of Stinson v. Turner, 473 F.2d 913 (10th Cir. 1973) 
and State v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1977), the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the 
plea to be withdrawn. In Stinson, the court held that where 
the appellant had made a recent and clear statement before 
the sentencing judge that he understood the charge and the 
maximum punishment and the judge was advised of the plea 
bargain, the refusal to permit the plea to be withdrawn was 
not an abuse of discretion by the state trial court. And 
in Yeck, supra, this Court stated: 
The right to a jury trial is consti-
tutionally guaranteed but it may be waived, -
and when no issue is raised as to innocence, 
there is nothing to try. Once a !lea of 
guilty is knowingly and voluntari y entered, 
there are no issues for trial. Where, as 
here, the plea of guilty is entered apparently 
in a plea bargaining deal, there is no 
compelling reason to permit it to be with-
drawn by the accused. It is a matter lying 
entirely within the discretion of the trial 
court and the denial of a motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea will be reversed on appeal only 
when an abuse of discretion is shown on the 
part of the trial judge. [Footnotes omitted.] 
Id. at 1249. (Emphasis added.) 
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Appellant's argument that he was the victim of a 
manifest injustice because the trial court did not follow 
the recommendations of the examining psychiatrists, fails 
to recognize that the trial court is not bound by any 
recommendations. Under § 76-3-404 Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
as amended, "after receiving the report and recommendations, 
the court shall proceed to sentence a defendant in accordance 
with the sentencing alternatives provided under§ 76-3-102." 
A trial court is not bound by a plea bargain agreement, unless 
the court in some way induced the plea. Santobello v. New 
York, 404 U.S. 257, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 92 S.Ct. 495 (1971) cited 
by appellant is only applicable if the prosecution has failed 
to carry out its bargained for obligation. In Santobello, 
Mr. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority stated: 
This phase of the process of criminal 
justice and the adjudicative element 
inherent in accepting a plea of guilty, 
must be attended by safeguards to insure 
the defendant what is reasonably due in 
the circumstances. Those circumstances 
will vary, but a constant factor is that 
when a plea rests in any significant 
degree on a promise or agreement by the 
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be 
part of the inducement or consideration, 
such promise must be fulfilled. 
404 U.S. at 262. 
In the present case, appellant agreed to plead 
guilty pursuant to a plea bargaining process, upon the advice 
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of competent counsel, voluntarily and knowingly. This was 
not a case where the appellant was not given the promised 
bargain by the prosecution. The prosecution ;kept its part 
of the bargain by amending the charge from second degree 
murder to manslaughter, and by recommending to the trial 
court that appellant not be incarcerated (R. 27) . Appellant 
was given no promise that he would not be sentenced to prison, 
he could only be assured that the prosecutor would make the 
recommendation. The fact that appellant expected leniency 
i~ not enough to render his guilty plea involuntary, nor does 
the fact that a plea of guilty was entered because of the 
possibility of obtaining a more lenient sentence make such a 
plea an involuntary one. In Miles v. Parratt, 543 F.2d 638 
(8th Cir. 1976), the appellant contended that the state trial 
court should be bound b~ a plea agreement or, in the alternative 
that the court is required to indicate to the defendant its 
rejection of the terms of the plea agreement and afford the 
. . 
defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea before sentence 
is pronounced. In rejecting both alternatives the Miles 
court stated: 
[T]he evidence adduced at the hearing 
indicates that appellant knew that the 
court was not legally bound by the plea 
agreement, and that appellant merely 
believed that the court would probably 
go along. Such a subjective belief that 
a lenient sentence wi·11 be imposed, even 
if based on an erroneous estimate by 
defense counsel, does not render a plea 
involuntary. [Citations omitted] 
Id. at 639. (Emphasis added.) 
-8-
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Appellant attempts to distinguish the overwhelming 
case law which acknowledges that a trial court has discretion 
in accepting or rejecting the withdrawal of a plea, by asserting 
that most cases involve a motion to withdraw after sentencing, 
rather than before as in the present case. However, several 
Utah cases deal directly with an attempted withdrawal prior 
to sentencing. 
In State v. Larson, 560 P.2d 335 (Utah 1977) the 
defendant attempted to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing, 
claiming a later discovered basis of defense. In rejecting 
the appeal this Court stated: 
We are convinced that the trial court 
took all the necessary precautions to 
insure that the guilty plea was volun-
tary and that the consequences of such 
a plea were clearly understood by appel-
lant. To hold otherwise would allow a 
defendant to change a olea at will up 
until the time of sentencing. 
Id. at 337. (Emphasis added.) 
Furthermore, in State v. Olafson, 567 P.2d 1~6 (Utah 
1977) this Court rejected the appellant's argument that any 
withdrawal prior to sentencing should be granted as a matter 
of right. The appellant in Olafson claimed that his plea was 
not voluntary and that he had a good and meritorious defense. 
This Court stated: 
Defendant finally contends this Court 
should adopt a ruling that a motion to 
set aside a plea of guilty, filed prior 
-9-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to sentencing, should be granted as a 
matter of right. 
Section 77-24-3 U.C.A. (1953) provides: 
. • . The court may at anytime before 
judgment, upon a plea of guilty, permit 
it to be withdrawn and a plea of not 
guilty substituted. 
This Court has consistently interpreted 
thi~ statute as conferring "a discretion-
ary power upon the trial court to allow 
or disallow the change of a plea." 
[Footnotes orn~tted] 
Id. at 158. (Emphasis added.) 
From these cases it is apparent that regardless of 
whether an attempt to withdraw a guilty plea is made before 
or after sentencing, the decision to allow the motion rests 
entirely within the discretion of the trial court, and absent 
the showing of clear abuse, this decision will not be disturbed. 
Appellant has shown no abuse, consequently the trial court's 
decision should be affirmed. 
Appellant was aware that the trial judge was not 
planning to follow the plea bargain as a result of a conversatio1 
in chambers with the trial judge prior to the sentencing 
proceeding {R. 130). Appellant should ,not now be allowed to 
withdraw his plea simply because he feels he made a "bad deal" 
and didn't receive the sentence he believed he would get. 
Miles, supra. 
Finally although many other jurisdictions have 
expanded the right of defendants to withdraw guilty pleas, 
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Utah is not one of these jurisdictions. Utah law is clear 
on the issue of withdrawal of a plea. To allow or refuse 
to allow defendant's guilty plea to be withdrawn, is within 
the sound discretion of the trial court and can only be 
disturbed by a showing of clear abuse. The fact that an 
accused pleads guilty with the hope that he will not be 
incarcerated is insufficient to allow the withdrawal of a 
guilty plea where a sentence is imposed. Whether a guilty 
plea was coerced and involuntary is ordinarily a question 
of fact, and district court findings are not to be disturbed 
unless they are clearly erroneous or without support in the 
record. Gurulev. Turner, 461 F.2d 1083 (10th Cir. 1972}. 
Respondent respectfully submits that from the 
above it is clear that the trial court acted properly in 
accepting appellant's guilty plea. The appellant here 
entered a plea of guilty to the charge of manslaughter and 
received the correct sentence for that crime. Respondent 
urges this Court to affirm the trial court's ruling and the 
sentence imposed. 
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POINT II 
APPELLANT SUFFERED NO VIOLATION OF 
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS SINCE THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT DOES NOT EXTEND TO A PRE-
SENTENCE INVESTIGATION. 
On March 5, 1980, appellant entered a plea of 
guilty to an amended charge of manslaughter under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1953), as amended. After finding 
the plea to be voluntary and informing appellant of his 
rights and the possible consequences of a guilty plea, 
Judge David Sam referred the matter to the Adult Probation 
and Parole Department for a pre-sentence investigation and 
report. Following a thorough investigation into the incident, 
including appellant's background, marital history, health, 
employment history, and collateral contacts, it was the 
recommendation of Adult Probation and Parole that probation 
be denied and that appellant be committed to the Utah State 
Prison for the term prescribed by law. 
It is appellant's contention that the sta£f-
meeting, "paneling," of Adult Probation and Parole, at 
which the staff reviewed all the information regarding 
appellant's case and made its written recommendation to 
the court, constituted a "hearing" and as such appellant 
had a constitutional right to be present and heard and 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him. Since 
-12-
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appellant was not present at this staff meeting, he asserts 
that his due process rights as guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution were violated. 
It is respondent's position that the formulation of a pre-
sentence report by Adult Probation and Parole is not a 
hearing subject to Sixth Amendment protections. Since 
appellant had no constitutional right to be present at 
the staff meeting, there was no violation of due process. 
Appellant cites no cases in support of his 
theory that he was constitutionally entitled to be present 
when the Adult Probation and Parole staff made their report. 
Case law on the subject rejects appellant's theory, as 
evidenced by Commonwealth ex rel. Lockhart v. Myers, 
165 A.2d 400 (Pa. 1960), cert. den. 368 U.S. 860, 7 L.Ed.2d 
57, 82 s.ct. 102, where the Court wrote: 
Appellant complains that testimony was 
then given by unsworn witnesses in his 
absence. It is of course true that a 
defendant charged with a felony has a 
right to be present at every stage of 
the proceedings from arraignment to the 
rendition of the verdict. [Citations 
omitted.] However, this right does not 
extend to a pre-sentence investigation. 
Id. at 405 (emphasis added). 
In Utah, a defendant may have the contents of a 
pre-sentence report disclosed to him prior to sentencing. 
In State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1980), this Court 
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held that the trial court conunitted reversible error in 
sentencing defendant where a pre-sentence report prepared 
by the Adult Probation and Parole Department had not 
been disclosed to the defendant. However, appellant in 
the instant case is not asserting he was denied access 
to the pre-sentence report, rather he contends he 
should have been present when the report was made. This 
Court appears to have touched on this question in Lipsky: 
However, it does not follow that 
§ 77-35-13 encompasses the pre-sentence 
report. On the contrary, we hold, for the 
reasons discussed below, that the trial 
court may receive information concerning 
the defendant in the form of a pre-sentence 
report without the author of the report 
necessarily personally appearing and 
testifying in open court, as would be 
required by § 77-35-13, but that the 
report should be disclosed to the defendant. 
If the defendant thinks the report inaccurate, 
he should then have the opportunity to bring 
such inaccuracies to the court's attention. 
Id. at 1244 (emphasis added). 
The California Supreme Court in People v._ Arbuckle, 
587 P.2d 220 (Calif. 1978), similarly held that a defendant 
had no right to cross-examine Department of Corrections' 
employees who had prepared a sentencing report. The Arbuckle 
Court said: 
The defendant could have challenged 
factual statements contained in the report 
by presenting his own evidence; but funda-
mental fairness does not require that he be 
-14-
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allowed to challenge such statements by 
cross-examining the personnel who prepared 
the report, nor does it require that he be 
permitted to challenge the professional 
methods they employed. 
Id. at 223 (emphasis added). 
Applying the rationale of both Lipsky and 
Arbuckle, if the author of a report need not testify or 
be confronted in open court, neither should the meeting 
at which the report is formulated be subject to confrontation 
or cross-examination. Accordingly the absence of appellant 
from the meeting or appellant's inability to confront and 
cross-examine cannot be a violation of appellant's due 
process rights. 
Appellant's due process rights were fully guaranteed 
by the opportunity to examine his pre-sentence report and to 
be heard on those items in the report which the trial court 
would be considering in sentencing. Appellant's failure to 
take advantage of these opportunities should not be the 
basis of this Court's extending due process rights to 
including being present at a pre-sentence investigation 
since this goes beyond the scope and intent of the Sixth 
Amendment protections. 
Since appellant's claim is neither supported by 
constitutional interpretation nor statutory or case law, 
respondent respectfully asks this Court to reject 
appellant's claim. 
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Moreover, appe·llant' s claim would impose an 
impossible administrative burden on the Adult Probation 
and Parole Department. Appellant's argument also 
ignores the fact that a staff paneling is not an 
adversary hearing or a hearing, but rather an executive 
function not affected by the Sixth Amendment. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT'S SENTENCE IS WITHIN STATUTORY 
LIMITS SET BY THE UTAH LEGISLATURE FOR 
A SECOND DEGREE FELONY; THEREFORE, THE 
SENTENCE IS NOT CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISH-
MENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT. 
Appellant pled guilty to the charge of manslaughter, 
a second degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1953), 
as amended, and was sentenced under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(2~ 
(1953), as amended, for the indeterminate term of not less 
than one year nor more than fifteen years. It is appellant's 
contention that the sentence providing for incarceration at 
the Utah State Prison constitutes cruel and unusual_ punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
It is the general rule that a sentence which imposes 
punishment within the limits prescribed by a valid statute 
cannot amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Smith v. 
United States, 273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. den. 
363 U.S. 846, 4 L.Ed.2d 1729, 80 s.ct. 1619 (1960). See 
also Matter of Jones, 578 P.2d 1150 (Mont. 1978); United 
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States v. MacClain, 501 F.2d 1006 (10th Cir. 1974). 
Similarly, even if the penalty imposed is harsh, it 
does not mean it constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment. People v. Lake, 580 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1978). 
In State v. Ethington, 592 P.2d 768 (Ariz. 
1979), the appellant asserted that the sentence 
imposed was so excessive that it constituted cruel 
and unusual punishment. The Court held: 
Appellant's sentence is within statutory 
limits, and since the statute has not been 
declared unconstitutional, his sentence 
cannot be deemed cruel and unusual 
punishment. 
Id. at 770 (footnotes omitted). In a special concurrence, 
Justice Gordon wrote: 
In order to challenge a penalty as 
cruel and unusual, this Court, adhering 
to the weight of authority on the subject, 
has indicated that the statute imposing 
the sentence, rather than the specific 
sentence itself, must be shown to be 
unconstitutional: 
"[W]here the statute fixing punishment 
for an offense is not unconstitutional, 
a sentence within the limits prescribed 
by such statute will not be regarded as 
cruel and unusual." (Emphasis added.) 
State v. Castano, 89 Ariz. 231, 233, 360 
p • 2d 4 7 9 ' 4 8 0 ( 19 61 ) . 
Id. at 771 .(emphasis added). 
Appellant in this case does not challenge the 
constitutionality of the statute imposing the sentence, 
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but merely argues that the sentence as applied to him is 
cruel and unusual. In People v. Wingo, 534 P.2d 1001 
(Calif. 1975), the California Supreme Court wrote: 
Finally we pause to emphasize the 
considerable burden a defendant must over-
come in challenging a penalty as cruel or 
unusual. [Footnotes omitted.) The doctrine 
of separation of powers is firmly entrenched 
in the law of California, and a court should 
not lightly encroach on matters which are 
uniquely in the domain of the Legislature. 
Perhaps foremost among these are the 
definition of crime and the determination 
of punishment. [Citations omitted.] While 
these intrinsically legislative functions 
are circumscribed by the constitutional 
limits of article 1, section 17, the validity 
of enactments will not be questioned ''unless 
there unconstitutionality clearly, positively 
and unmistakably appears." [Citations omitted.] 
Id. at 1006. 
The Utah State Legislature has determined that 
conviction of the crime of manslaughter is punishable by 
imprisonment of between one and fifteen years at the Utah 
State Prison. Appellant was sentenced within the limits 
proscribed by the legislature. Merely asserting that the 
sentence is excessive as applied to him is not enough. In 
State v. Nance, .20 Utah 2d 372, 438 P.2d 542 (1968), appellant 
in addition to challenging the constitutionality of the 
statute, argued that the imposition of the maximum sentence 
for a check of $13.32 was so excessive as to constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment. This Court said: 
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Generally if the statute fixing the 
punishment be not unconstitutional, a 
sentence within the limits prescribed 
by such a statute will not be regarded 
as cruel and unusual. However, where 
there is a wide spread between the 
minimum and maximum punishment, 
whether any particular sentence is 
cruel or unusual is a matter to be 
determined under all the facts and 
circumstances. [Footnotes omitted.] 
We cannot impose our judgment on the 
trial court. Our inquiry is limited to 
the question of whether the sentence 
imposed in proportion to the offense 
committed is such as to shock the moral 
sense of all reasonable men as to what 
is right and proper under the circum-
stances. [Footnotes omitted.] 
Id. at 544. Appellant pled guilty to the crime of manslaughter, 
the victim being a month old baby. The trial judge acting 
within his discretion and the statutory limits, sentenced 
appellant to an indeterminate sentence of not less than one 
year nor more than fifteen year.s. In pronouncing the 
sentence, the trial judge stated: 
Before pronouncing judgment I wish 
to state that the court has reviewed 
the medical reports and the recommendations 
that are contained therein and it is the 
judgment of the court that because of the 
nature of the offense and the manner in 
which the offense was committed that 
this offense should not go unpunished. 
(R.132). Taking all the facts and circumstances into 
account, the trial judge sentenced appellant to the term 
provided by law. As such, the sentence is neither "shocking 
to the conscious,'' Lloyd v. State, 576 P.2d 740 {Nev. 1978); 
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nor an abuse of judicial discretion. 
Appellant's sentence cannot be considered cruel 
and unusual punishment for three reasons: first, the 
sentence was within statutory limits; second, appellant 
has failed to challenge the constitutionality of the statute; 
third, there was no showing of any abuse of judicial discre-
tion, nor was the sentence disproportionate to the crime. 
For these reasons, respondent respectfully asks this Court 
to aff irrn the sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the trial court validly accepted a 
guilty plea and did not abuse its discretion in sentencing 
or in refusing to vacate the plea, respondent respectfully 
asks the court to affirm the judgment and sentence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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